display all the ideas for this combination of texts
15 ideas
14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
Full Idea: A ground does not merely necessitate its truth. A ground is also what its truth is appropriately about. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.II) |
14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
Full Idea: It is not always obvious what (if anything) a truth is about, in the sense of 'about' relevant to Truthmaker and truth-supervenient-on-being. Prior says 'Queen Anne is dead' is not about Queen Anne, and may be about the Earth. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.III) | |
A reaction: A very nice and rather subtle objection to the Truthmaker thesis. Specifying the truthmaker for a given truth looks like a doddle in simple cases, but clearly it can become extremely elusive in other cases. |
14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
Full Idea: If a single ball goes from being red to being white, Truthmaker implies that something exists which makes it true that the second thing follows the first. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.V) |
14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Truthmaker makes it impossible simply to remove an entity. One must always replace it with something else; namely, a truthmaker for the claim that that entity does not exist. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4.I-3) | |
A reaction: This is a particularly strong and persuasive argument from Merricks against the truthmaker view. Clearly the truthmaker for non-existence can't be there when it exists, and the destruction bringing the negative truthmaker into existence sounds odd. |
14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Truthmaker says that, for each truth, there is something that, by its mere existence, makes that truth true, …so Truthmaker has de re modality at its core. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 5.III) | |
A reaction: I have no problem with de re modality, so this doesn't bother me. Merricks brings out nicely the baggage which you must carry if you are a Truthmaker. |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The claim 'that Fido is brown' seems to demand only a brown Fido, but Truthmaker demands more. It demands both that a state of affairs along the lines of 'Fido's being brown' exists, and also that this state has its constituents essentially. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4.I) | |
A reaction: One would need to reread Merricks to get this clear, but my instinct is that the two scenarios are not very different. 'A brown Fido' would require Fido to be necessarily brown to do the job. |
14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
Full Idea: 'Truth supervenes on being' says that any two possible worlds alike with respect to what entities exist and which properties (and relations) each of those entities exemplifies are thereby alike with respect to what is true. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: Merricks says this view is found in early Wittgenstein, as well as in David Lewis. He suggests that this is a weaker and more plausible thesis than the full commitment to truthmakers. It still allows some truths to lack truthmakers. Sounds plausible. |
14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
Full Idea: If 'truth supervenes on being' aims to articulate the idea that truth depends on being, it must say more than that truth supervenes on being. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4.VI) | |
A reaction: This is a perennial problem with supervenience accounts, such as the supervenience of beauty on the object, or of mind on brain. |
14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
Full Idea: It is implausible that a claim asserting that a thing fails to exist is made true by - and so is appropriately about - some other, existing thing. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.V) |
14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Because Truthmaker offers no analysis of being true, Truthmaker is not the correspondence theory of truth. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 1.IV) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that the correspondence theory offers an 'analysis' of truth. It doesn't seem to do much more than offer a word which suggests an analogy with some relation in the world. |
14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
Full Idea: That 'there might have been a dozen more fundamental particles' is true, but not appropriately about any existing entities or their properties. Since Truthmaker says that all truths are about existing entities, it must be false. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.VI) | |
A reaction: Since I don't necessarily agree that 'there might have been a dozen more fundamental particles' (see Scientific Essentialism), and I take the disagreement to have some basis, I doubt this idea. What stops 'there could be circular squares' from being true? |
14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
Full Idea: I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but it is not obvious that that proposition is thus about me. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.I) | |
A reaction: This is part of the general rather good objection that it is often unclear what a truth is 'about' (Idea 14408). The original Gettier examples about justification illustrate this problem. They make things true, in a surprising way. |
14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Suppose for the sake of argument that the correspondence theory is correct. Then it is analytic that each necessary truth, in virtue of being true, corresponds to something. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 2.II) | |
A reaction: The sort of nice simple observation for which I admire Merricks. You don't have to give up on the correspondence theory at this point, but you will have to go through with some substantial metaphysics to keep it afloat. |
14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Being true is not a relation. …Being true is a monadic property. …Being true is a primitive property. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 8.IV) | |
A reaction: Even after reading Merricks on this, I am not sure I understand it. If a single sentence floats in the void, it is hard to see how the 'monadic' property of truth could accrue to it. |
14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
Full Idea: I take 'deflationism' to be nothing other than the claim that there is no property of being true. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 8.V) |