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Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic' and 'Justice: What's the right thing to do?'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel]
     Full Idea: The duty to tell the truth applies only to those who deserve the truth.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05)
     A reaction: [from Benjamin Constant, in opposition to Kant] I prefer the idea that we should use people 'after our own honour and dignity' (Hamlet), which means speaking the truth even to Donald Trump (for those of you who remember 2018). But not always.
Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel]
     Full Idea: A carefully crafted evasion pays homage to truth-telling in a way that an outright lie does not.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05)
     A reaction: Nicely put. He refers to an incident in Kant's life. I think of the great equivocation controversy at the time of the 1605 Gunpowder Plot. See the porter in Macbeth. All I ask is that people care about the truth. Many people don't. Why?
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
     Full Idea: Truth in a model is interesting because it provides a transparent and mathematically tractable model - in the 'ordinary' rather than formal sense of the term 'model' - of the less tractable notion of truth.
     From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.131)
     A reaction: This is an important warning to those who wish to build their entire account of truth on Tarski's rigorously formal account of the term. Personally I think we should start by deciding whether 'true' can refer to the mental state of a dog. I say it can.
Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
     Full Idea: There is an enormous difference between the truth of sentences in the interpreted language of set theory and truth in some model for the disinterpreted skeleton of that language.
     From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.132)
     A reaction: This is a warning to me, because I thought truth and semantics only entered theories at the stage of 'interpretation'. I must go back and get the hang of 'skeletal' truth, which sounds rather charming. [He refers to set theory, not to logic.]