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Ideas for 'General Draft', 'On Formally Undecidable Propositions' and 'Summa Theologicae'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4)
     A reaction: Amazing how many modern thinkers fail to grasp this simple distinction. However, the truth is not quite the same for all if diverse persons are expressing a single truth with different concepts and languages. The word 'facts' is helpful here.
Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf]
     Full Idea: Lying can involve (1) speaking false words, (2) the intention to speak false words, (3) the intention of bringing about deception, and (4) the ultimate goal of one's deception.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q110) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 10 'Lying'
     A reaction: It's a start, but much more is needed to clarify lying. Irony is an obvious problem with (1).
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and if truth does not exist, then the proposition 'Truth does not exist' is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3)
     A reaction: A classic example of turning the tables, also applicable to anyone who firmly denies knowledge, or that words are meaningful, or says that meaning needs verification. However, one measily truth is not much consolation.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Gödel, by Quine]
     Full Idea: Gödel's proof wrought an abrupt turn in the philosophy of mathematics. We had supposed that truth, in mathematics, consisted in provability.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Willard Quine - Forward to Gödel's Unpublished
     A reaction: This explains the crisis in the early 1930s, which Tarski's theory appeared to solve.