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3 ideas
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To set up a philosophy which barricades the road of further advance toward the truth is the one unpardonable offence in reasoning. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: This is Popper's rather dubious objection to essentialism in science. Yet Popper tried to do the same thing with his account of induction. |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Whether or not 'truth' has two meanings, I think 'holding for true' has two kinds. One is practical holding for true which alone is entitled to the name of Belief; the other is the acceptance of a proposition, which in pure science is always provisional. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: The problem here seems to be that we can act on a proposition without wholly believing it, like walking across thin ice. |
12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
Full Idea: 'Truth' may, like 'proof', be a term with only intra-theoretic applications. | |
From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §5) | |
A reaction: I think we can blame Tarski (via Quine, Kuhn's teacher) for this one. I take it to be an utter failure to grasp the meaning of the word 'truth' (and sneakily substituting 'satisfaction' for it). For a start, we have to compare theories on some basis. |