display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Contemporary deflationism about truth does not attempt to define truth, and does not rely on models containing the truth predicate. Instead they are interpretations of axiomatic theories of truth, containing only basic laws of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.3) |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
Full Idea: On the conception of deflationism developed in this book, the prime positive role of the truth predicate is to serve as a device for expressing generalities, and an inferential tool. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 07.5) |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Deflationism is not a theory of the laws of truth. It is a view on the nature and role of the concept of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 05 Intro) |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
Full Idea: According to 'inferential deflationism', truth is a concept without a nature or an essence. This is betrayed by the fact that there are no unrestricted logical laws that govern the concept of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.1) |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Deflationism says the theory of truth does not have a substantial domain of its own. The domain of the theory of truth consists of the bearers of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 05.1) | |
A reaction: The immediate thought is that truth also concerns falsehoods, which would be inexplicable without it. If physics just concerns the physical, does that mean that physics lacks its own 'domain'? Generalising about the truths is a topic. |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The Deflationary view just says that instead of asserting a sentence, we can turn the sentence into an object and assert that this object has the property of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 05.2.2) | |
A reaction: That seems to leave a big question hanging, which concerns the nature of the property that is being attributed to this object. Quine 1970:10-13 says it is just a 'device'. Surely you can rest content with that as an account of truth? |