display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
Full Idea: The deflationist view is silent about the fact that our assertions and beliefs are generally made or held for certain reasons. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
A reaction: The point here must be that I attribute strength to my beliefs, depending on how much support I have for them - how much support for their real truth. I scream "That's really TRUE!" when I have very good reasons. |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
Full Idea: Deflationism about truth seems to deprive us of any hope of asking genuinely metatheoretical questions, which are the questions that occupy philosophers most of the time. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
A reaction: This seems like the best reason for moving from deflationism to at least minimalism. Clearly one can talk meaningfully about the success of assertions and theories. You can say a sentence is true, but not assert it. |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
Full Idea: We could compare the status of 'true' with the status of the logical operator 'and' in logic. Once we have explained how it functions to conjoin two propositions, there is not much more to be said about it. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.4) | |
A reaction: A good statement of the minimalist view. I don't believe it, because I don't believe that truth is confined to language. An uneasy feeling I can't put into words can turn out to be true. Truth is a relational feature of mental states. |