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Ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Introduction to Philosophical Papers II' and 'Conversations, with Glyn Daly'

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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
     Full Idea: Even if talk of truth as correspondence to the facts is metaphorical, it is a bad metaphor for analytic truth in a way that it is not for synthetic truth.
     From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: A very simple and rather powerful point. Maybe the word 'truth' should be withheld from such cases. You might say that accepted analytic truths are 'conventional'. If that is wrong, then they correspond to natural facts at a high level of abstraction.