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3 ideas
10844 | The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: What could fit more perfectly the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2) |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
Full Idea: In semantic theories of truth (Tarski or Kripke), a truth predicate is defined for an object-language. This definition is carried out in a metalanguage, which is typically taken to include set theory or another strong theory or expressive language. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Presumably the metalanguage includes set theory because that connects it with mathematics, and enables it to be formally rigorous. Tarski showed, in his undefinability theorem, that the meta-language must have increased resources. |
10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: It is of prime importance to distinguish the fact that the use of 'true' always glances backwards or forwards to the actual or envisaged making of a statement by someone. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §1) | |
A reaction: 'The truth of this matter will never be known'. Strawson is largely right, but it is crazy for any philosopher to use the word 'always' if they can possibly avoid it. |