display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If a theory is a better approximation to the truth, then it is likely that it will have greater predictive power. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VIII.8) |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To set up a philosophy which barricades the road of further advance toward the truth is the one unpardonable offence in reasoning. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: This is Popper's rather dubious objection to essentialism in science. Yet Popper tried to do the same thing with his account of induction. |
3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot explicate a useful notion of verisimilitude in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by a theory, because they are infinite. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.4) |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Whether or not 'truth' has two meanings, I think 'holding for true' has two kinds. One is practical holding for true which alone is entitled to the name of Belief; the other is the acceptance of a proposition, which in pure science is always provisional. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: The problem here seems to be that we can act on a proposition without wholly believing it, like walking across thin ice. |