Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Nature of Things', 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver)' and 'The Coherence Theory of Truth'
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15 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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19125
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If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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19079
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For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
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19076
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Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
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19077
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Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
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19078
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Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
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19084
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Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
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19083
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How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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19128
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If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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19120
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Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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19127
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The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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19124
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A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
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19126
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If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
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19129
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The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
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19130
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KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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19075
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Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
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