Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making' and 'Spinoza's Ethics'
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21 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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10916
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Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle]
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10914
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Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle]
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10913
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Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
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575
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If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
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15775
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Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
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18335
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There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
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18334
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The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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18339
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The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
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18333
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Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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18342
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Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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18340
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It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
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10915
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The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
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18341
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Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
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18346
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'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
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18345
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'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
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18343
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Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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18338
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Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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586
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Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
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19165
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Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson]
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18337
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Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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18347
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Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
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