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Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Explanation - Opening Address' and 'The Tarskian Turn'
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35 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
10913
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Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle]
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10916
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Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle]
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10914
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Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle]
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15323
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Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten]
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15324
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Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15374
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Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
15348
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Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
575
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If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
15775
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Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10915
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The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
586
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Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
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19165
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Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
15333
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Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
15337
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The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
15334
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The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten]
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
15336
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The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
15354
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Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten]
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15340
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Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15345
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Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15332
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'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten]
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15346
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Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten]
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15361
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A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten]
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15371
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An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten]
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15350
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The Naïve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten]
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15351
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Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten]
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15367
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By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten]
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15373
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Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
15330
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Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
15331
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Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15325
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Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten]
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15356
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Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten]
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15344
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Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten]
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15368
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This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten]
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15358
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Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten]
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15359
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Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten]
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