Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Vagaries of Definition' and 'Truthmaking for Presentists'
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8 ideas
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
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15775
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Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
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If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
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The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
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The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
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One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
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We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
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