Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'Truth Rehabilitated' and 'Truth and Truthmakers'
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15 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
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23291
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Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
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23284
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Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
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23286
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Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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18467
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Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
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18468
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Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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18377
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Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]
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18382
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The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
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18394
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In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
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18384
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One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
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18387
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The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
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18386
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What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
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18381
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Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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23292
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Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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23288
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When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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23287
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Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
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