Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Architecture of Theories', 'External and Internal Relations' and 'The Tarskian Turn'

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27 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
15324 Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten]
15323 Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15374 Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
15348 Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
15333 Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
15337 The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
15334 The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
15336 The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
15354 Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten]
15340 Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15345 Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15373 Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten]
15346 Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten]
15371 An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten]
15332 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten]
15361 A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten]
15350 The Naïve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten]
15351 Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten]
15367 By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
15330 Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
15331 Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15325 Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten]
15344 Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten]
15356 Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten]
15368 This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten]
15358 Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten]
15359 Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten]