Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Nature of Rationality' and 'Intro to Contemporary Epistemology'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
|
22664
|
I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
|
2768
|
The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
|
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
|
2765
|
Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J]
|
|
2769
|
If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J]
|
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
|
2766
|
Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J]
|
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
|
22665
|
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
|