Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Logical Properties', 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)' and 'Reason, Truth and History'
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14 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
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Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
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In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
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In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel]
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7617
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Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
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6084
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'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn]
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6085
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The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
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The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn]
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
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Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
6086
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Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn]
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6087
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Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn]
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