Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Extrinsic Properties', 'Truth' and 'Merely Possible Propositions'
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8 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
4737
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Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
4750
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The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
4744
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We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
4738
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The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
4745
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Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
4753
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Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
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4755
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Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4751
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Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
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