Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths', 'Reason, Truth and History' and 'Non-foundationalist epistemology'
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5 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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4714
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Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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7617
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Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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4716
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The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
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7616
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Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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10170
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While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
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