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'fragments/reports', 'Truthmaking for Presentists' and 'Truth and Predication'
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22 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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19160
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A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
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19151
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Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
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19144
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'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
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18928
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If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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18931
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Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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18932
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The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
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18923
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The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
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18926
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One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
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18929
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We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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19148
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There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
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19166
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The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
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19167
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Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
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19150
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Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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19145
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We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
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19146
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Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
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19174
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Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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19136
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Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
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19139
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Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
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19147
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Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
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19172
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To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
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19153
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Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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19170
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Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
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