Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Difference and Repetition', 'Intros to 'Buddhist Scriptures'' and 'The Semantic Conception of Truth'
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18 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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19178
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Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
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19177
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A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
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19186
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A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
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19194
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We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
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19196
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Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski]
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19180
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It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski]
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19181
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In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski]
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19182
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Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]
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19183
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Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski]
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19198
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We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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19184
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The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
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19191
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Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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19188
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We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski]
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19189
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The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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10824
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If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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19190
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We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
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19197
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Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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19185
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Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]
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