Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', 'Frege philosophy of mathematics' and 'Truth and Ontology'
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21 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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6276
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'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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14415
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A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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14408
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Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
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14395
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If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
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14398
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Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
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14403
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If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
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14397
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Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
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14396
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If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
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14400
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If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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14394
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It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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14390
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Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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14412
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Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
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14414
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I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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6266
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We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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6277
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Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
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14418
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Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
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14391
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If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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6264
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In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
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6265
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Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
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6269
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Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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14419
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Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
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