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'Truth-makers', 'Timaeus' and 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences'
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12 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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6276
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'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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10911
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Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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10906
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Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
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10907
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The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
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10909
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Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
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10912
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Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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6266
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We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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6277
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Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
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10908
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Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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6264
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In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
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6265
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Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
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6269
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Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
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