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'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'fragments/reports' and 'The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages'
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28 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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16295
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Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
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15342
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Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
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19069
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'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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16296
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Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
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15339
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Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten]
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16302
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Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach]
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19135
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Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski]
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19138
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Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski]
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4699
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Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady]
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19324
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Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski]
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10672
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Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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15410
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Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
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18811
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Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
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15365
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We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
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19314
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For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
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19316
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Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
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19175
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Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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16303
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Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach]
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19134
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Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski]
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16304
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Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski]
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2571
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Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack]
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10821
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Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H]
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10822
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A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski]
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10969
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Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read]
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17746
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Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki]
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10904
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Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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16306
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Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach]
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15322
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Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten]
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