Combining Texts
Ideas for
'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and 'Truthmakers'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
21 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
|
18486
|
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
|
18484
|
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
|
18466
|
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
|
|
10910
|
The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
|
18473
|
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
|
|
18481
|
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
|
18483
|
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
|
23462
|
He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
|
18479
|
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
|
|
18477
|
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
|
18482
|
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
|
18349
|
All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
|
18474
|
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
|
|
18485
|
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
|
|
18490
|
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
|
|
18493
|
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
|
10967
|
Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
|
|
7087
|
Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
|
|
4702
|
The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
|
|
7056
|
Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
|
23483
|
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
|