Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology' and 'Truth'
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18 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
4737
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Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18877
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Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18868
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Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18867
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Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
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18873
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God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18879
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What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
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18880
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Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
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18874
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Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18869
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Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18871
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I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
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18870
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Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
4750
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The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
4744
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We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
4738
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The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
4745
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Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
4753
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Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
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4755
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Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4751
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Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
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