Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Writing the Book of the World', 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction' and 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
14 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
14992
|
We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider]
|
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18369
|
There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10910
|
The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15012
|
Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
23462
|
He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18349
|
All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami]
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
10967
|
Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
|
7087
|
Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
|
4702
|
The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
|
7056
|
Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
23483
|
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
|
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19318
|
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
|
19319
|
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
|
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19320
|
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
|