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'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Ordinary Objects' and 'Truth'
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12 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
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Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
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The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
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15654
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If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
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Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
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Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
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