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'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Metaphysics' and 'works'
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15 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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10916
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Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle]
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10914
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Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle]
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10913
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Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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15647
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Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
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575
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If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
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15775
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Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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10915
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The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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586
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Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
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19165
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Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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15649
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In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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15655
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Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
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15654
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If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
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15650
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Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
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15648
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Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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15656
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Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
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