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'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Reply to Sixth Objections' and 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'
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15 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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15647
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Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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10910
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The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
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23462
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He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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18349
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All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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10967
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Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
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7087
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Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
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4702
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The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
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7056
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Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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23483
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Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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15649
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In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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15655
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Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
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15654
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If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
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15648
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Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
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15650
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Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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15656
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Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
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