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Ideas for
'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity' and 'Truth-making and Correspondence'
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18 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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18365
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If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
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15647
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Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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18362
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Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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18360
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It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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18358
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Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
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18355
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What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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18354
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Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
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18356
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Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
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18363
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Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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18364
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Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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18357
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What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
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One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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15649
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In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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15655
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Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
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15654
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If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
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15648
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Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
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15650
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Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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15656
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Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
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