Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Evolution of Logic', 'Truth-making and Correspondence' and 'Db (lexicon)'
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14 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18365
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If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18362
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Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18360
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It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18358
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Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
18355
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What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18356
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Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
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18363
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Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
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18354
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Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18364
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Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
13469
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Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD]
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18357
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What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
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18359
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One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
13504
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Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
13503
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A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
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