Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Evolution of Logic', 'Truth (2nd edn)' and 'Democracy in America (abr Renshaw)'
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11 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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6334
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The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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6342
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Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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13469
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Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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6332
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The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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13504
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Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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13503
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A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
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6335
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The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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23299
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Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
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6336
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No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
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6337
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The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
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6344
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Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
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