Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Evolution of Logic', 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)' and 'The Problem of Possibilia'
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10 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
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If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
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Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
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Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
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