Combining Texts
Ideas for
'', 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth' and 'Truth (2nd edn)'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
12 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
|
6334
|
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
|
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
|
23295
|
Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
|
6342
|
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
|
23298
|
Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
|
|
6332
|
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
|
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
|
23297
|
The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
|
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
|
23296
|
We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
|
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
|
6335
|
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
|
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
|
6344
|
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
|
|
6337
|
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
|
|
6336
|
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
|
|
23299
|
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
|