display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
Full Idea: There are some proposals for non-well-founded set theory (tolerating cases of self-membership and membership circularities). | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Aczel 1988, and Barwise and Moss 1996] |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
Full Idea: While mereology was originally offered with a nominalist viewpoint, resulting in a conception of mereology as an ontologically parsimonious alternative to set theory, there is no necessary link between analysis of parthood and nominalism. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites Lesniewski and Leonard-and-Goodman. Do you allow something called a 'whole' into your ontology, as well as the parts? He observes that while 'wholes' can be concrete, they can also be abstract, if the parts are abstract. |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
Full Idea: It is an open question whether there are any mereological atoms (with no proper parts), and also whether every object is ultimately made up of atoms. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3) | |
A reaction: Such a view would have to presuppose (metaphysically) that the divisibility of matter has limits. If one follows this route, then are there only 'natural' wholes, or are we 'unrestricted' in our view of how the atoms combine? I favour the natural route. |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
Full Idea: It is common in mereology to hold that there is something of which everything is part, but few hold that there is a 'null entity' that is part of everything. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This comes out as roughly the opposite of set theory, which cannot do without the null set, but is not keen on the set of everything. |