display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic). |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81 | |
A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable. |
18122 | Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock] |
Full Idea: None of the classical ways of defining one logical constant in terms of others is available in intuitionist logic (and this includes the two quantifiers). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2) |
18114 | There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock] |
Full Idea: There is so far no agreed set of axioms for set theory which is categorical, i.e. which does pick just one structure. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This contrasts with Peano Arithmetic, which is categorical in its second-order version. |
18107 | A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything, neither of a set nor of another proper class. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.4) |
18115 | We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We could add the axiom that all sets are constructible (V = L), making the universe of sets as small as possible, or add the axiom that there is a supercompact cardinal (SC), making the universe as large as we no know how to. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: Bostock says most mathematicians reject the first option, and are undecided about the second option. |
18139 | The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The usual accounts of ZF are not restricted to subsets that we can describe, and that is what justifies the axiom of choice. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.4 n36) | |
A reaction: This contrasts interestingly with predicativism, which says we can only discuss things which we can describe or define. Something like verificationism hovers in the background. |
18105 | Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Replacement (or the Axiom of Subsets, 'Aussonderung', Fraenkel 1922) in effect enforces the idea that 'limitation of size' is a crucial factor when deciding whether a proposed set or does not not exist. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.4) |