Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy' and 'Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number'

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5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
     A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic).
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81
     A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
     Full Idea: Predicativists doubt the existence of sets with no predicative definition.
     From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 02.3)
     A reaction: This would imply that sets which encounter paradoxes when they try to be predicative do not therefore exist. Surely you can have a set of random objects which don't fall under a single predicate?
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
     Full Idea: The iterative conception justifies Power Set, but cannot justify a satisfactory theory of von Neumann ordinals, so ZFC appropriates Replacement from NBG set theory.
     From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 09.9)
     A reaction: The modern approach to axioms, where we want to prove something so we just add an axiom that does the job.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
     Full Idea: The limitation of size conception of sets justifies the axiom of Replacement, but cannot justify Power Set, so NBG set theory appropriates the Power Set axiom from ZFC.
     From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 09.9)
     A reaction: Which suggests that the Power Set axiom is not as indispensable as it at first appears to be.