display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic). |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81 | |
A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable. |
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The new discovery was that with a suitable structure imposed on the space of possible worlds, the Leibnizian idea would work for all modal logics. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1) |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If T is only possible if S obtains, and S is possible but doesn't obtain, then T is only possible in the world where S obtains, but T is not possible in the actual world. It follows that the relation of relative possibility is not transitive. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If T is only possible if S obtains, T and S hold in the actual world, and S does not obtain in world v possible relative to the actual world, then the actual is not possible relative to v, since T holds in the actual. Accessibility can't be symmetrical. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1) |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If some world is 'a way the world might be considered to be if things were different in a certain respect', that might show that the accessibility relation should not be taken to be transitive, and we should have to adopt modal logic T. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8) | |
A reaction: He has already rejected symmetry from the relation, for reasons concerning relative identity. He is torn between T and S4, but rejects S5, and opts not to discuss it. |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
Full Idea: In S4 logic the actual world is, in itself, special, not just from our point of view. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8) | |
A reaction: S4 lacks symmetricality, so 'you can get there, but you can't get back', which makes the starting point special. So if you think the actual world has a special place in modal metaphysics, you must reject S5? |