display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
| 13270 | Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is a difficulty about part and whole, ...whether the part and the whole are one or more than one, and in what way they can be one or many, and, if they are more than one, in what way they are more than one. | |
| From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 185b11), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.3 | |
| A reaction: He only states the problem here, but doesn't pursue it. I take the real question of mereology to be what makes a many into a one. I don't see a problem with a many being simultaneously a one. |
| 10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
| Full Idea: Van Ingwagen writes of 'mereological nihilism' (that only mereological atoms exist) and of 'mereological universalism' (adhering to the principle of Unrestricted Composition). | |
| From: report of Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], p.72-) by Achille Varzi - Mereology 4.3 | |
| A reaction: They both look mereologically nihilistic to me, in comparison with an account that builds on 'natural' wholes and their parts. You can only be 'unrestricted' if you view the 'wholes' in your vast ontology as pretty meaningless (as Lewis does, Idea 10660). |