Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Nominalism' and 'works'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Quine has showed us how set theory - now recognised to be positively awash in Platonistic metaphysics - can and should be prevented from infecting logic proper.
     From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Intro
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó]
     Full Idea: The relationship between an object and its singleton is puzzling. Our intuitive conception of a set is a collection of objects - what are we to make of a collection of a single object?
     From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 4.1)
     A reaction: The ontological problem seems to be the same as that of the empty set, and indeed the claim that a pair of entities is three things. For logicians the empty set is as real as a pet dog, but not for me.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Quine suggests that V = L be accepted in set theory because it makes for a cleaner theory, even though most set theorists are skeptical of V = L.
     From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.1
     A reaction: Shapiro cites it as a case of a philosopher trying to make recommendations to mathematicians. Maddy supports Quine.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Two things can never entail three things.
     From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.17