display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
7794 | There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle] |
Full Idea: In S4 there are fourteen modalities: no-operator; necessarily; possibly; necessarily-possibly; possibly-necessarily; necessarily-possibly-necessarily; and possibly-necessarily-possibly (each with its negation). | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 3.5) | |
A reaction: This is said to be 'more complex' than S5, but also 'weaker'. |
7793 | ◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle] |
Full Idea: The critical formula that distinguishes S5 from all others is: ◊p → □◊p. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 3.3) | |
A reaction: If it is possible that it is raining, then it is necessary that it is possible that it is raining. But if it is possible in this world, how can that possibility be necessary in all possible worlds? |
7795 | S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle] |
Full Idea: In S5 there are six modalities: no-operator; necessarily; and possibly (and their negations). In any sequence of operators we may delete all but the last to gain an equivalent formula. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 3.5) | |
A reaction: Such drastic simplification seems attractive. Is there really no difference, though, between 'necessarily-possibly', 'possibly-possibly' and just 'possibly'? Could p be contingently possible in this world, and necessarily possible in another? |
7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |
Full Idea: Modal logics were, for a long time, studied in terms of axiom systems. The advent of possible worlds semantics made it possible to study them in a semantic way as well. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 6.5) |
7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
Full Idea: In possible worlds logics a statement is true-in-a-world rather than just true. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds relativist, but I don't think it is. It is the facts which change, not the concept of truth. So 'donkeys can talk' may be true in a world, but not in the actual one. |
7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
Full Idea: The four important logical equivalences in modal logic (the Modal Negation equivalences) are: ¬◊p↔□¬p, ◊¬p↔¬□p, □p↔¬◊¬p, and ◊p↔¬□¬p. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [Possibly is written as a diamond, necessarily a square] These are parallel to a set of equivalences between quantifiers in predicate logic. They are called the four 'modal negation (MN) equivalences'. |