Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Ontology and Mathematical Truth' and 'Logical Necessity'

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2 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: It is a widely accepted thesis that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §5)
     A reaction: Rumfitt goes on to defend this standard view (against Dummett's defence of S4). The point, I take it, is that one can only assert that something is 'true in all possible worlds' only when the worlds are all accessible to one another.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Any set with a concrete member is 'impure'. 'Pure' sets are those that are not impure, and are paradigm cases of abstract entities, such as the sort of sets apparently dealt with in Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory.
     From: Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.116)
     A reaction: [I am unclear whether Jubien is introducing this distinction] This seems crucial in accounts of mathematics. On the one had arithmetic can be built from Millian pebbles, giving impure sets, while logicists build it from pure sets.