display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: For contemporary logicians, it is not non-contradiction that provides the criterion for what is thinkable, but rather inconsistency. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The point is that para-consistent logic might permit isolated contradictions (as true) within a system, but it is only contradiction across the system (inconsistencies) which make the system untenable. |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics were only developed in order to prevent computers, such as expert medical systems, from deducing anything whatsoever from contradictory data, because of the principle of 'ex falso quodlibet'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics are only ever dealing with contradictions inherent in statements about the world, never with the real contradictions in the world. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: Thank goodness for that! I can accept that someone in a doorway is both in the room and not in the room, but not that they are existing in a real state of contradiction. I fear that a few daft people embrace the logic as confirming contradictory reality. |
10676 | The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Choice seems better treated as a non-logical principle of set-theory. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4 n8) | |
A reaction: This reinforces the idea that set theory is not part of logic (and so pure logicism had better not depend on set theory). |
10686 | The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack] |
Full Idea: We cannot explicitly define one-one correspondence from the sets to the ordinals (because there is no explicit well-ordering of R). Nevertheless, the Axiom of Choice guarantees that a one-one correspondence does exist, even if we cannot define it. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 10) |
10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934]) |
10687 | Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack] |
Full Idea: We might reduce sets to ordinal numbers, thereby reversing the standard set-theoretical reduction of ordinals to sets. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 10) | |
A reaction: He has demonstrated that there are as many ordinals as there are sets. |
10677 | Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack] |
Full Idea: Extensional mereology defs: 'distinct' things have no parts in common; a 'fusion' has some things all of which are parts, with no further parts. Axioms: (transitivity) a part of a part is part of the whole; (sums) any things have a unique fusion. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 5) |