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2 ideas
| 18074 | Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Though it may appear that the intuitionist is providing an account of the connectives couched in terms of assertability conditions, the notion of assertability is a derivative one, ultimately cashed out by appealing to the concept of truth. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.5) | |
| A reaction: I have quite a strong conviction that Kitcher is right. All attempts to eliminate truth, as some sort of ideal at the heart of ordinary talk and of reasoning, seems to me to be doomed. |
| 6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Eventually set theory will have to be either naturalised or rejected, if a thoroughgoing physicalism is to be maintained. | |
| From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 8.4) | |
| A reaction: Personally I regard Platonism as a form of naturalism (though a rather bold and dramatic one). The central issue seems to be the ability of the human main/brain to form 'abstract' notions about the physical world in which it lives. |