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2 ideas
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
Full Idea: In logic, acceptability conditions can replace truth conditions, ..and the only price one has to pay for this is that one has to abandon the implausible Fregean idea that logic is the theory of truth preservation. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |
A reaction: This has always struck me as correct, given that if you assign T and F in a semantics, they don't have to mean 'true' and 'false', and that you can do very good logic with propositions which you think are entirely false. |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
Full Idea: It has often been uncritically assumed that logic that was initially a tool for clarifying mathematics could be seamlessly and uniformly applied in the effort to clarify ordinary language and philosophy, but this has been a real mistake. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not saying he's right (since you need stupendous expertise to make that call) but my intuitions are that he has a good point, and he is at least addressing a crucial question which most analytical philosophers avert their eyes from. |