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Ideas for 'The Bhagavad Gita', 'Manuscript remains' and 'Trees, Terms and Truth'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic

18912	Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
	Full Idea: Nineteenth century logicians debated whether logic should be treated simply as a branch of mathematics, and mathematics could be applied to it, or whether mathematics is a branch of logic, with no mathematics used in formulating logic.
	From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 3)
	A reaction: He cites Boole, De Morgan and Peirce for the first view, and Frege and Russell (and their 'logicism') for the second. The logic for mathematics slowly emerged from doing it, long before it was formalised. Mathematics is the boss?

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

18922	Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
	Full Idea: The underlying logical syntax of language is close to the surface syntax of ordinary language.
	From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 5)
	A reaction: This is the boast of the Term logicians, in opposition to the strained and unnatural logical forms of predicate logic, which therefore don't give a good account of the way ordinary speakers reason. An attractive programme. 'Terms' are the key.

18905	Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
	Full Idea: Sommers's 'tree theory' of predication assumes that propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms joined by some kind of predicational glue.
	From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 2)
	A reaction: This is the basis of Sommers's upgraded Aristotelian logic, known as Term Logic. The idea of reasoning with 'terms', rather than with objects, predicates and quantifiers, seems to me very appealing. I think I reason more about facts than about objects.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not

18908	Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
	Full Idea: Standard logic recognises only one kind of negation: sentential negation. Consequently, negation of a general term/predicate always amounts to negation of the entire sentence.
	From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 3)