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2 ideas
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
Full Idea: Peirce takes bivalence not to be a law of logic, but a regulative assumption of enquiry. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 2 n10 | |
A reaction: I like this. For most enquiries it's either true or not true, it's either there or it's not there. When you aren't faced with these simple dichotomies (in history, or quantum mechanics) you can relax, and allow truth value gaps etc. |
22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle the principle of bivalence is primarily a principle of metaphysics, not logic. It applies to entities in the real order first, and to propositions in the rational order second. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 5 | |
A reaction: This is because nothing is vague. Boulter says this is also the case with non-contradiction. I like this idea very much. I reject the Fregean picture of the autonomy of the rational order. Logic is powerful because it reflects reality. |