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Ideas for 'works', 'New Essays on Human Understanding' and 'Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

12992	Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.10)
	A reaction: Leibniz had a higher opinion of logic than contemporaries like Locke. The question is whether logic can actually teach us better order than we could otherwise manage, or whether it just describes what most thinkers do.

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism

10056	At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: At bottom eternal truths are all conditional, saying 'granted such a thing, such another thing is'.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.11.14), quoted by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §4
	A reaction: Thus showing Leibniz to have sympathy with the if-thenist view. He cites geometry as his illustration.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

4730	For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
	Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality.
	From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4
	A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

12974	People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Someone who goes wrong in relating an idea to a name will usually go wrong about the thing he wants the name to stand for.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.29)
	A reaction: This seems to give tentative support to a Millian account of names, whose only content is just the thing which is named. Leibniz's observation certainly seems to be right.

5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation

13002	It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: To reduce the number of axioms is always something gained.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.06)
	A reaction: This is rather revealing about the nature of axioms. They don't have any huge metaphysical status - in fact one might say that their status is epistemological, or even pedagogic. They enable us to get out minds round things.