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Ideas for 'works', 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy' and 'works'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Three periods can be distinguished in philosophical logic: the syntactic stage, from Russell's definite descriptions to the 1950s, the dominance of possible world semantics from the 50s to 80s, and a current widening of the subject.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] I've read elsewhere that the arrival of Tarski's account of truth in 1933, taking things beyond the syntactic, was also a landmark.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
4730 For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
     Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4
     A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional.
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Logical formalization forces the investigator to make the central philosophical concepts precise. It can also show how some philosophical concepts and objects can be defined in terms of others.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 2)
     A reaction: This is the main rationale of the highly formal and mathematical approach to such things. The downside is when you impose 'precision' on language that was never intended to be precise.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: A (logical) model is a set with functions and relations defined on it that specify the denotation of the non-logical vocabulary. A series of recursive clauses explicate how truth values of complex sentences are compositionally determined from the parts.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: See the ideas on 'Functions in logic' and 'Relations in logic' (in the alphabetical list) to expand this important idea.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
10082 There are infinite sets that are not enumerable [Cantor, by Smith,P]
     Full Idea: Cantor's Theorem (1874) says there are infinite sets that are not enumerable. This is proved by his 1891 'diagonal argument'.
     From: report of George Cantor (works [1880]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 2.3
     A reaction: [Smith summarises the diagonal argument]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
13483 Cantor's Paradox: the power set of the universe must be bigger than the universe, yet a subset of it [Cantor, by Hart,WD]
     Full Idea: The problem of Cantor's Paradox is that the power set of the universe has to be both bigger than the universe (by Cantor's theorem) and not bigger (since it is a subset of the universe).
     From: report of George Cantor (works [1880]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 3
     A reaction: Russell eliminates the 'universe' in his theory of types. I don't see why you can't just say that the members of the set are hypothetical rather than real, and that hypothetically the universe might contain more things than it does.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
8710 The powerset of all the cardinal numbers is required to be greater than itself [Cantor, by Friend]
     Full Idea: Cantor's Paradox says that the powerset of a set has a cardinal number strictly greater than the original set, but that means that the powerset of the set of all the cardinal numbers is greater than itself.
     From: report of George Cantor (works [1880]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: Friend cites this with the Burali-Forti paradox and the Russell paradox as the best examples of the problems of set theory in the early twentieth century. Did this mean that sets misdescribe reality, or that we had constructed them wrongly?